@inproceedings{oai:kutarr.kochi-tech.ac.jp:00001199,
 author = {Huang, Wen-Haw and Yin, Samuel Yen-Lian and Tserng, H. Ping},
 book = {Society for Social Management Systems Internet Journal},
 month = {May},
 note = {While the control mechanisms of incentive contracts have been widely studied, this study attempts to determine the optimal control over a cost-plus percentage contract of a construction project. Cost-plus percentage contract shifts some risk from the contractor to client, thus offering little incentive for the contractor to control costs. The owner requires additional management over the construction project to ensure that only necessary costs are spent. The data are collected through documentation and interviews with both the owner and contractor. Empirical results indicate that multiple control mechanisms are necessary to manage properly the total cost of the projects. The owner cannot rely entirely on the contractor to control costs in a cost-plus percentage contract.},
 publisher = {Society for Social Management Systems},
 title = {Dynamics of control mechanisms in a cost plus percentage contract},
 volume = {8},
 year = {2012}
}