{"_buckets": {"deposit": "eaf6c67b-2c80-4167-8fcf-e67e1f007850"}, "_deposit": {"created_by": 2, "id": "1237", "owners": [2], "pid": {"revision_id": 0, "type": "depid", "value": "1237"}, "status": "published"}, "_oai": {"id": "oai:kutarr.kochi-tech.ac.jp:00001237", "sets": ["25"]}, "author_link": ["3318", "3319"], "item_5_biblio_info_7": {"attribute_name": "書誌情報", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"bibliographicIssueDates": {"bibliographicIssueDate": "2014-12", "bibliographicIssueDateType": "Issued"}, "bibliographicVolumeNumber": "9", "bibliographic_titles": [{"bibliographic_title": "Society for Social Management Systems Internet Journal"}]}]}, "item_5_description_4": {"attribute_name": "抄録", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_description": "One of urgent issues for sustainable development of the Chinese construction industry is\nargued to be developing capable specialty contractors in the downstream of supply chain. One valuable\napproach inspired from Japanese construction is argued to be building long-term relationship between\nGeneral Contractor (GC) and a group of allied subcontractors (SCs). Then there comes a crucial issue as how\nto initiate and motivate the involved players to establish and maintain this cooperative business relationship,\nparticularly under today’s extremely competitive and uncertain business environment.\nThis study aims to explore the potential incentives of long term relationship. A tentative game-chain\nmodel was conducted on the psychological competition scenarios between GC and SC in the activity of\nresource allocating. In this model, maintaining a long term working relationship is interpreted as a chain of\ngames, in which the former game will exert influence on the latter through the actions each player takes. As a\nresult, the systematic equilibrium must be approached based on a holistic and dynamic thinking. The analytic\nresults show that under an uncertain and dynamic situation in resource allocating, one-off game (as\nshort-term work relationship) between GC and SC leads to the worst equilibrium, interpreted as cheating\nbehaviors by both players. However, with the game repeating more times (forming a game-chain), the\nsystematic equilibrium moves to honest behaviors by both players, with an increase in both utilities. It\nindicates that long-term relationship could provide with economic incentive for both players in their\neconomic activities.\nIn future study, this approach needs to be evaluated more comprehensively, particularly on its potential\ndemerits. For example, if SCs are too much “locked in” vertical relationship with GC, it might easily lead to\nSCs’ inability to diversity and over-reliance. It again reveals the significance of more careful considerations\non implementation practically.", "subitem_description_type": "Abstract"}]}, "item_5_publisher_36": {"attribute_name": "出版者", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_publisher": "Society for Social Management Systems"}]}, "item_5_version_type_19": {"attribute_name": "著者版フラグ", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_version_resource": "http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85", "subitem_version_type": "VoR"}]}, "item_creator": {"attribute_name": "著者", "attribute_type": "creator", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "Tingyu, An"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "3318", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}, {"creatorNames": [{"creatorName": "Watanabe, Tsunemi"}], "nameIdentifiers": [{"nameIdentifier": "3319", "nameIdentifierScheme": "WEKO"}]}]}, "item_files": {"attribute_name": "ファイル情報", "attribute_type": "file", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"accessrole": "open_date", "date": [{"dateType": "Available", "dateValue": "2019-02-13"}], "displaytype": "detail", "download_preview_message": "", "file_order": 0, "filename": "sms13-4426.pdf", "filesize": [{"value": "147.4 kB"}], "format": "application/pdf", "future_date_message": "", "is_thumbnail": false, "licensetype": "license_free", "mimetype": "application/pdf", "size": 147400.0, "url": {"label": "sms13-4426.pdf", "url": "https://kutarr.kochi-tech.ac.jp/record/1237/files/sms13-4426.pdf"}, "version_id": "5f021cb3-ece5-4183-b644-1317d43acee3"}]}, "item_language": {"attribute_name": "言語", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_language": "eng"}]}, "item_resource_type": {"attribute_name": "資源タイプ", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"resourcetype": "conference paper", "resourceuri": "http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794"}]}, "item_title": "A Tentative Exploration of Incentives to Introduce Long Term Relationship between Construction General Contractor and Subcontractor from a Game-Chain Perspective", "item_titles": {"attribute_name": "タイトル", "attribute_value_mlt": [{"subitem_title": "A Tentative Exploration of Incentives to Introduce Long Term Relationship between Construction General Contractor and Subcontractor from a Game-Chain Perspective"}]}, "item_type_id": "5", "owner": "2", "path": ["25"], "permalink_uri": "http://hdl.handle.net/10173/1240", "pubdate": {"attribute_name": "公開日", "attribute_value": "2015-02-28"}, "publish_date": "2015-02-28", "publish_status": "0", "recid": "1237", "relation": {}, "relation_version_is_last": true, "title": ["A Tentative Exploration of Incentives to Introduce Long Term Relationship between Construction General Contractor and Subcontractor from a Game-Chain Perspective"], "weko_shared_id": -1}